Defence Debacle in the UK: Training in the Firing Line

The reason for the delay in publication of the UK’s long-awaited Defence Investment Plan (DIP) became apparent on 11th June with the abrupt departure of the Secretary of State for Defence, John Healey, followed closely by the Minister for the Armed Forces, Alistair Carns, both accompanied by excoriating letters of resignation: John Healey’s followed convention by praising the Government’s achievements before listing its manifold failings; Al Carns’s did not.

The core issue is, to paraphrase John Healey, the Chancellor’s unwillingness to fund the increase in military spending required by last year’s Defence Review, and the Prime Minister’s inability to persuade or coerce her to do so. For the training and simulation community, however, the more immediate question is not why this happened, but where the consequences will be felt. MS&T’s Dim Jones examines the likely fallout.

The answer is straightforward: training, exercises and day-to-day readiness activity are likely to bear some of the burden.

Assuming that the new Defence Secretary, Dan Jarvis, fails to secure any additional funding – which appears to be the case –the MoD will be forced to identify substantial savings. The department has reported a budget deficit of £28 billion; the Treasury offer is £13.5 billion, of which £3.5 billion is apparently expected to accrue from ‘efficiency savings’ within the department.

Many of the high-value equipment programmes are contractually committed and, although some funding could be reprofiled, this risks diplomatic difficulties with partners; the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP), involving Italy and Japan, and the AUKUS (Australia and the US) Attack Submarine are two examples. Other programmes are already experiencing difficulties, including the Ajax Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV), the E-7 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft and, according to recent reports, the Challenger 3 Main Battle Tank (MBT) – and this is before we even consider changes to the equipment programme reflecting the combat experience of Ukraine and the Middle East.

Faced with these pressures, the MoD’s options become limited.  Defence budget funds are not generally ring-fenced, and the low-hanging fruit is short-term and day-to-day expenditure: flying hours cost for aircraft, track miles for AFVs, sea time for ships; maintenance programmes; and spares support. All of these will impact on in-service equipment availability and, since operations will take priority, training is where a lot of the pain will be felt. Most of this will be day-to-day, but some will be international and alliance exercises, failure to participate in which will further deplete the UK’s standing with allies and partners.

This inevitability was confirmed this week by the Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Rich Knighton, to the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee: “The thing that I’m most concerned about is the level of day-to-day activity funding……because that funds operational activity and drives exercises and training. We will have to dial back……our exercise and operational activity if the level of resource funding that’s available to us does not increase. It would be disingenuous of me to suggest that there’s going to be no impact as a consequence of the settlement”.

The Treasury's position appears to be that the MoD wastes money, particularly on high-value procurement programmes, and that increased funding would simply amount to throwing good money after bad. There is undoubtedly some truth in the criticism. Defence procurement has rarely covered itself in glory. Yet this argument fails to address the reality of a military that is under-strength, under-equipped and under-resourced in an increasingly dangerous world.

Nor is this a recent problem. Governments of both political persuasions since the end of the Cold War bear collective responsibility for the current position. Although Healey is widely respected by the Armed Forces, across the Parliamentary parties, and among international counterparts, and both Carns and Jarvis possess distinguished operational records, the broader level of military understanding within the Whitehall machine remains remarkably low. Successive Prime Ministers have trumpeted the primacy of Defence of the Realm, but for more than three decades it has manifestly not been their first priority.

Any shortfall will be further exacerbated by rising inflation, not least an 88% increase in the cost of aviation fuel. It is also worth pointing out that operational deployments reduce the availability of personnel and equipment for other activity, and that the training value of these operations is necessarily mission-focused, and is not always conducive to achieving and maintaining the more general level of professional competence which drives readiness.

Two additional areas are also likely to suffer: Research and Development and Infrastructure. Lack of up-front funding for R&D will be felt most keenly by SMEs, which are less able to absorb it than the larger companies; the recent demise of aerospace start-up Aeralis is a case in point.  Infrastructure is an easy target with short-term gains and long-term consequences. Reports are that the Treasury has already reduced the budget for the long-overdue refurbishment of the Defence Housing Estate; this is unlikely to raise morale.

There is a saying in the military: “If you can’t take a joke, you shouldn’t have joined”. For many in Defence, particularly those responsible for generating readiness through training and exercises, this has now gone well beyond a joke.